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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 19, 1993, after the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
fifty-one day standoff with David Koresh and his Branch Davidian 
followers, millions of Americans watched in horror on live television 
as flames engulfed the Davidians’ four-story wooden compound near 
Waco, Texas. The fire left nearly eighty men, women, and children 
dead, thus constituting “the deadliest law-enforcement incident in 
U.S. history”1 and indelibly searing the Waco tragedy onto the 
national psyche. 
In the aftermath of the events at Waco, Branch Davidian 
survivors and family members of those who died in the fire filed a 
$675 million civil wrongful-death lawsuit against the United States,2 
setting the stage for what many came to see as the ultimate 
showdown between the Branch Davidians and the federal 
government.3 The lawsuit, which was brought against the United 
States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA” or “the 
Act”),4 alleged that negligent and intentional acts by federal law 
enforcement agents caused or contributed to the Branch Davidians’ 
deaths.5 After a highly-publicized, four-week trial during the summer 
 
 1.  Lee Hancock, Davidian Battle Goes to Court: U.S., Sect Will Offer Accounts of 
Standoff, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 18, 2000, at 41A; see also Dave Harmon, Seven Years 
Later, Waco Questions Linger, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 28, 2000, at A1. At least twenty 
of the Branch Davidians died of gunshot wounds that were self-inflicted or inflicted by other 
Davidians. See Andrade v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 778, 784 (W.D. Tex. 2000). 
 2.  Although referred to herein as a single lawsuit, the Waco/Branch Davidian civil 
litigation began as ten different lawsuits that were subsequently consolidated. See Andrade v. 
Chojnacki, 65 F. Supp. 2d 431, 447 n.10 (W.D. Tex. 1999). 
 3.  See Ross E. Milloy, Jury Finds for U.S. in Deaths at Waco, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 
2000, at A1 (“The lawsuit itself represent[ed] a six-year legal struggle that ultimately became a 
highly publicized test of the government’s credibility.”); Esther M. Bauer, Jury Clears U.S. 
Agents in Deaths at Waco, WASH. POST, July 15, 2000, at A1 (The “trial was the most 
thorough exploration to date of the government’s controversial actions against the Branch 
Davidians.”); Lee Hancock, No-Nonsense Style Defines Waco Judge, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Oct. 25, 1999, at 1A [hereinafter Hancock, No-Nonsense Style] (quoting trial judge as 
describing the Waco litigation as “unprecedented in subject matter, scope and public 
attention”); Hancock, supra note 1 (describing interests at stake for both parties in the 
lawsuit); Mark England, Stakes High in Davidian Proceedings, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, June 18, 
2000, at 1A (also describing interests at stake for both parties in the lawsuit). 
 4.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 5.  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged (1) “[t]hat Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
[(“ATF”)] agents used excessive force in the initial raid to serve search and arrest warrants on 
Feb. 28, 1993,” which resulted in a gunfight in which four agents and approximately six 
Davidians were killed; (2) that FBI agents used converted tanks beyond the limits of the 
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of 2000, the United States prevailed on all issues, and the federal 
district court placed sole responsibility for the deaths at Waco on 
David Koresh.6 
What few outside the proceedings realize, however, is the extent 
to which a single decision by the trial judge—to impanel an advisory 
jury—fundamentally changed the trial and risked further fueling the 
controversy about the Waco tragedy. 
When a person sues the United States in tort under the FTCA, 
the Act requires that the case be tried by a federal district court 
judge, rather than a jury.7 However, just three weeks before trial, the 
judge in the Waco litigation, who otherwise would have served as the 
sole fact-finder, “[h]aving considered the importance of the issues 
involved in this case,” ordered that an advisory jury be impaneled to 
issue a verdict.8 
Notwithstanding the judge’s understandable desire for advice 
from a panel of citizen-jurors in the highly-charged Waco litigation, 
the use of an advisory jury violated both the letter and intent of the 
FTCA’s prohibition of jury trials.9 Furthermore, the presence of the 
advisory jury fundamentally changed the presentations made by the 
parties at trial, increased the length, expense, and complexity of the 
proceeding, and unnecessarily injected the potential for contradictory  
 
operations plan approved by the Attorney General; (3) that FBI agents caused or contributed 
to the fire that destroyed the Davidians’ compound on April 19, 1993; and (4) that the FBI 
failed to have firefighting equipment on hand to fight the fire. See Terry Ganey, Lawsuit by 
Branch Davidians Comes to Trial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 18, 2000, at A1. The 
plaintiffs also alleged that FBI agents fired on the compound before and during the fire. The 
court later considered and dismissed this claim. See Andrade, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 783. 
 6.  See Andrade, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 785 n.2 (concluding that “[t]he entire tragedy . . . 
can be laid at the feet of this one individual [David Koresh]”). The advisory jury verdict in 
favor of the United States that preceded the district court’s written ruling was named one of 
the “top defense wins of 2000” by the National Law Journal. See Margaret Cronin Fisk, The 
Best Defense, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 19, 2001, at A1. 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing that suits brought pursuant 
to the FTCA “shall be tried by the court without a jury”). 
 8.  Andrade v. United States, Civ. No. W-96-CA-139 (and consolidated actions), 
Docket No. 643, at 2 (W.D. Tex. May 26, 2000) (order to impanel advisory jury); Lee 
Hancock, Jury to Decide Suit on Branch Davidian Deaths, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 27, 
2000, at 31A; Ganey, supra note 5; see also Paul Duggan, More Upset Than Interested, Waco 
Awaits Replay in Court: As Branch Davidian Case Nears Trial, City Distances Itself, WASH. 
POST, June 9, 2000, at A3 (stating that the judge “surprised attorneys on both sides recently 
when he announced he would impanel a jury to hear the lawsuit”). 
 9.  28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994). 
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verdicts by the judge and advisory jury into what was already a highly 
controversial case. 
By impaneling an advisory jury, however, the trial judge in the 
Waco case was following an ongoing trend in which federal district 
court judges impanel “advisory juries” to assist them in deciding 
FTCA cases against the United States.10 In electing to use such 
advisory panels, these courts cite a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
that ostensibly grants them the discretion to do so.11 When an 
advisory jury is used, the trial judge still must make the final decision 
on the United States’ liability under the FTCA, but does so only 
after receiving the advisory jury’s verdict.12 
Although advisory juries have been used or discussed in 
approximately forty published FTCA cases since the passage of the 
Act in 1946,13 “[j]udges rarely have explained why they have chosen 
to call, or not to call, an advisory jury.”14 Likewise, neither the 
available decisions nor any known articles or studies evaluate the 
propriety, desirability, or impact of using advisory juries in FTCA 
cases. 
This Article attempts to fill that void. Part II briefly relates the 
historical and legislative background of the FTCA before discussing 
 
 10.  See, e.g., Hamm v. Nasatka Barriers Inc., 166 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1996); 
Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 988 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d as modified, 588 
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 11.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 39(c) (“In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court 
upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury . . . .”). 
 12.  See Hamm, 166 F.R.D. at 3 (“An advisory verdict has no force, other than 
persuasive, on the court, which remains the sole and final decision-maker.”). 
 13.  This figure was obtained through multiple searches of electronic databases and 
supplemented by cross-referencing other published materials, such as cases, articles, and 
treatises. The obvious and inherent limitation of such a figure is that it omits advisory jury 
cases that do not generate published opinions. Likewise, even in cases that result in published 
opinions, the advisory jury issue may have been insufficiently significant or contested by the 
parties to warrant mention in the written opinion. Rather, in such cases, the court may have 
resolved the advisory jury issue through a pretrial ruling not subsequently incorporated into 
the final opinion on the merits. Such a scenario occurred in the Waco/Branch Davidian 
litigation. 
That advisory juries have been used in significantly more cases than those resulting in 
published opinions has been confirmed by conversations between the author and other 
Department of Justice attorneys who have tried FTCA advisory jury cases that did not result in 
published opinions. Given these limitations, the extent of the use of advisory juries may be a 
fertile subject for further survey and statistical research. 
 14.  9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 2335, at 210 (2d ed. 1994). 
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the requirement that cases brought pursuant to the FTCA be tried to 
a judge rather than a jury. Part III then explains how both the 
applicable statutory language and congressional intent preclude the 
use of advisory juries in FTCA cases. Part IV discusses the practical 
complications and systemic costs inherent in impaneling and using 
an advisory jury. The Article concludes by arguing that advisory 
juries, while understandably appealing to federal judges, are contrary 
to the letter and intent of the FTCA and often create more problems 
than they solve. 
II. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE USE  
OF ADVISORY JURIES 
We are confident that district judges, sitting without a jury as 
required by 28 U.S.C. § 2402, will be able to dispose of [FTCA] 
complaints intelligently . . . .15 
Since its passage in 1946, the Federal Tort Claims Act has served 
as an important jurisprudential fixture in the federal courts. With 
very limited exceptions, all tort suits against the United States must 
be brought pursuant to the FTCA and its limitations.16 As a 
foundation for understanding the interplay between advisory juries 
and the Act, subpart A supplies a brief history of the FTCA and its 
prohibition of jury trials in favor of bench trials. Subpart B then 
examines the historical use of advisory juries, particularly in FTCA 
cases against the United States. 
A. The FTCA and Its Prohibition of Jury Trials 
As sovereign, the United States is immune from tort suits 
brought by its citizens.17 Absent a statutory waiver of that immunity, 
a person injured by the negligence of a federal government employee 
cannot sue the United States in tort to recover damages.18 
 
 15.  United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963) (involving prisoners’ FTCA 
actions based on negligence of government employees). 
 16.  See Jeffrey Axelrad, The Federal Tort Claims Act: Taking Uncle Sam to Court, THE 
BRIEF, Winter 1993, at 19. 
 17.  See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 
471, 475 (1994). 
 18.  See Lehman, 453 U.S. at 160 (discussing the waiver of sovereign immunity found in 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1976 & Supp.  
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Historically, such a victim was without a judicial remedy, and the 
victim’s only relief was to petition Congress for redress through the 
cumbersome and uncertain process of a private bill.19 
Congress eventually became overwhelmed with the difficulty of 
attempting to address the increasing numbers of private bills for 
relief.20 Beginning in 1887, Congress repeatedly considered 
legislation to develop a tort remedy against the United States for 
persons injured by the negligence of federal government employees 
but never successfully passed a general tort claims statute.21 Over the 
following decades, similar attempts at enacting a general federal tort 
claims statute failed.22 
The impetus for legislative change finally occurred on the 
morning of July 28, 1945, when a United States Army bomber 
airplane was accidentally flown into the Empire State Building, 
killing and seriously injuring a number of people in the building and 
 
III)); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475 (discussing the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation’s statutory waiver of sovereign immunity). 
 19.  As indicated in Glasspool v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 804, 805 n.2 (D. Del. 
1961), the first private act of Congress in payment of a tort claim against the United States was 
the Act of April 13, 1792, 6 Stat. 8. 
 20.  See 1 LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT 
CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES § 2.02, at 2-6 (2001). In fact, as early as 
1832, John Quincy Adams complained that private matters of this sort were consuming an 
inordinate amount of Congress’s time and that Congress was ill-suited for handling such 
private claims. Id. (citing Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 77th Cong. 49 (1942)); see also id. § 2.08, at 2-48 to 2-49 (“So great was the 
volume of private relief measures introduced in Congress to provide damages to these 
claimants that it was said to be a physical impossibility for the Committees on Claims to 
examine the merits of each.”); id. § 2.08, at 2-49 n.8 (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 4756 (1926) 
(statement of Sen. Means)) (“It is a physical impossibility for us to give the consideration 
which Senators here are all requesting every day to numerous bills embodying small claims; we 
cannot do it, and there ought to be some means to provide for such matters.”); H.R. REP. NO. 
667, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), at 1; 74 CONG. REC. 6868 (1931); 75 CONG. REC. 
13,824 (1932) (statement of Sen. Howell); 86 CONG. REC. 12,018 (1940) (statement of Rep. 
Celler) (all discussing overwhelming number of bills involving small private claims and the 
need for a solution); 92 CONG. REC. 10,049 (1946) (statement of Rep. Dirksen) (describing 
the burden on Congress of considering private bills for relief); 92 CONG. REC. 10,092 (1946) 
(statement of Rep. Scrivner) (“[A]lmost half the bills introduced in this House are private 
bills.”). 
 21.  See 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 20, §§ 2.07, 2.09–.10 (chronicling prior 
legislative efforts to enact general tort claims act); 92 CONG. REC. 10,049 (1946) (statement 
of Rep. Dirksen) (describing previous efforts to enact tort claims act). 
 22.  See 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 20, §§ 2.07–.10; Comment, The Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 535 & n.10 (1947) (documenting previous legislative 
attempts to enact general tort claims law). 
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on the streets below.23 Because no statutory mechanism existed to 
allow suit against the federal government, however, the victims of 
this accident were left essentially without a remedy. Congress, placed 
in an untenable public-relations position, responded by passing the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, which became law on August 2, 1946.24 
The FTCA was thus a response to the perceived unfairness of 
failing to allow tort suits against the federal government, as well as a 
solution to the burden of responding to private bills for relief 
requiring individual congressional consideration.25 The Act is a 
limited waiver of sovereign immunity,26 making the federal 
government liable for certain torts of federal employees acting within 
the scope of their employment to the same extent as a private party 
under analogous circumstances.27 Actions under the FTCA cover a 
broad range of subject matter areas, including medical malpractice at 
government hospitals,28 accidents at national parks and other  
 
 
 23.  See 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 20, § 2.01, at 2-3. 
 24.  See id. § 2.10, at 2-66; Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-
601, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946). 
 25.  See Axelrad, supra note 16, at 19; 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 20, 
§ 3.01, at 3-3; Glasspool v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 804, 805 (D. Del. 1961) (citing as 
bases for passage of the FTCA “the justice of the right to make a claim against the 
Government for injuries caused by the negligence of a Governmental agent” and “the onerous 
and unsatisfactory action of Congress by private bills for relief”). 
 26.  Justice Holmes once explained the concept of sovereign immunity as follows: 
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign 
power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public 
property since before the days of Hobbes. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not 
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical 
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law 
on which the right depends. 
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (internal citation omitted). 
 27.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (giving district courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain suits against the United States if a private person would be 
liable under “the law of the place where the act or omission occurred”); United States v. 
Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976). The constitutional basis for enacting the FTCA is found 
in Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which gives Congress the authority 
“to pay the debts . . . of the United States.” See 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 20, 
§ 2.14, at 2-78 (citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587 (1941); Williams v. 
United States, 289 U.S. 553, 569, 579–81 (1933); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 
452 (1929)). 
 28.  See, e.g., Bueno v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 2d 627 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (involving 
the alleged failure of army and air force physicians to diagnose decedent’s heart condition). 
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federally-owned properties,29 malicious prosecution claims based on 
the actions of federal prosecutors,30 and a host of other factual 
situations. 
Congress qualified the FTCA’s waiver of the United States’ 
sovereign immunity, however, by including a number of limitations 
to suit against the United States. For instance, before an FTCA suit 
may be filed in federal court, its proponent must first file an 
administrative claim with the federal agency employing the allegedly 
negligent employee.31 The FTCA also precludes tort suits based on 
policy-based discretionary decisions,32 suits for intentional torts,33 or 
suits regarding actions taken in a foreign country.34 Furthermore, a 
plaintiff in an FTCA suit against the government may not recover 
punitive damages or pre-judgment interest.35 Because the above 
limitations are part of the United States’ waiver of its sovereign 
immunity, they define the jurisdiction of a court to entertain an 
FTCA suit.36 
An additional limitation imposed by Congress under the FTCA 
requires that trials against the United States be conducted by a court 
sitting without a jury.37 Therefore, when a plaintiff sues the United 
 
 29.  See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D.S.D. 1998) (involving 
the alleged failure of the National Park Service to prevent teenager from falling from cliff to his 
death at Badlands National Park). 
 30.  See, e.g., Torres-Dueno v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D.P.R. 2001) 
(involving allegations of malicious prosecution and excessive display of force in arrest based on 
United States Attorney’s unsuccessful conspiracy prosecution). 
 31.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2675. 
 32.  See id. § 2680(a). This exception, which is known as the “discretionary function 
exception” to the FTCA, precludes the imposition of liability against the United States for any 
claim that is “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or employee of the Government, 
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” Id. 
 33.  See id. § 2680(h). This limitation is further subject to an “exception to the 
exception,” commonly known as the “law enforcement proviso,” which allows suits for certain 
torts when committed by federal “investigative or law enforcement officers.” Id. 
 34.  See id. § 2680(k). 
 35.  See id. § 2674. 
 36.  See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981) (“[T]he United States, as 
sovereign, ‘is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent 
to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.’”) (quoting United 
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 
584, 586 (1941))). 
 37.  28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) specifically provides that “any action 
against the United States under [the FTCA] shall be tried by the court without a jury.” 
ZAB-FIN 2/15/2003 2:23 PM 
185] Advisory Juries 
 193 
States in tort pursuant to the FTCA, the trial must be heard by a 
federal district court judge, rather than a jury.38 
Plaintiffs in FTCA cases are not entitled to a jury trial because 
“[i]t has long been settled that the Seventh Amendment right to trial 
by jury does not apply in actions against the Federal Government.”39 
Indeed, sovereign immunity provides that in actions against the 
United States, because the government is presumptively immune 
from suit, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial never 
existed.40 
Accordingly, “[s]ince there is no generally applicable jury trial 
right that attaches when the United States consents to suit, the 
accepted principles of sovereign immunity require that a jury trial 
right be clearly provided in the legislation creating the cause of 
action.”41 In the case of the FTCA, Congress chose not to provide 
for the right to a jury trial and even affirmatively denied the use of 
juries to determine the United States’ tort liability.42 
Notwithstanding this clear prohibition by Congress, however, courts 
have increasingly chosen to impanel advisory juries in FTCA cases. 
B. Advisory Juries in Historical Perspective 
Advisory juries are not a new phenomenon and are not unique to 
FTCA cases. Historically, courts of equity in the United States could 
 
 38.  See, e.g., Lehman, 453 U.S. at 161 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2402) (stating that “in tort 
actions against the United States, . . . trials shall be to the court without a jury”). 
 39.  Id. at 160. 
 40.  Id. at 162 n.9; see also Comment, supra note 22, at 554 n.128 (explaining that the 
constitutionality of the FTCA’s proscription of jury trials “is not open to question, for, having 
the power to retain complete immunity, the Government is free to relax it on terms”). But see 
Roger W. Kirst, Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Time to Recognize the Seventh 
Amendment Right, 58 TEX. L. REV. 549 (1980) (arguing that the Seventh Amendment 
guarantees a right to a jury trial in FTCA actions against the United States). 
 41.  Lehman, 453 U.S. at 162 n.9. In Glasspool v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 804 (D. 
Del. 1961), the District of Delaware pointed out that 
[j]urisdiction of a District Court as to tort claims against the United States did not 
exist prior to the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Under that Act the 
jurisdiction is limited to a trial by the Court without a jury. The District Court has 
no authority or jurisdiction to empanel a jury for such causes. 
Id. at 806. 
 42.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2402; Lehman, 453 U.S. at 161 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2402) 
(internal citations omitted) (“[I]n tort actions against the United States, . . . trials shall be to 
the court without a jury.”); Glasspool, 190 F. Supp. at 807 (“The Federal Tort Claims Act . . . 
not only does not provide for a jury trial but absolutely forbids it.”). 
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summon advisory juries to assist them in deciding cases.43 However, 
such verdicts were non-binding, and the court could disregard them 
or adopt their verdicts only in part.44 In 1937, this historical power 
of trial court judges was incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as Rule 39(c).45 The rule provides that “[i]n all actions 
not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own 
initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury . . . .”46 
Since the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, 
courts in approximately forty published decisions have addressed the 
issue of advisory juries in FTCA cases.47 Despite an initial resistance 
to the use of advisory juries, courts have increasingly held that judges 
have the discretion to impanel an advisory jury pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c), notwithstanding the FTCA’s 
prohibition of jury trials.48 
In the first published cases to address the availability of advisory 
juries in FTCA cases, courts generally found that the FTCA’s 
prohibition of juries also encompassed advisory juries.49 In declining 
to impanel an advisory jury, these courts found the FTCA’s language 
 
 43.  See 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 2335; see also 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET 
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 39.40[1] (3d ed. 1997) (“The court, on motion or on its 
own initiative, may try any issue with an advisory jury. The power of a court to summon a jury 
to act in an advisory capacity is traceable to the Chancery Court. The chancellor in equity had 
the power to use an advisory jury to assist in deciding cases. This authority is now incorporated 
into Rule 39(c).”). The lineage of the advisory jury actually extends as far back as the 
fourteenth-century reign of Edward III. See Richard E. Guggenheim, A Note on the Advisory 
Jury in Federal Courts, 8 FED. B. ASS’N J. 200, 200 (1947). At that time, a court of equity 
“‘could not summon a jury, but issues of fact in these proceedings were sent for trial before the 
King’s Bench’, for the purpose of enlightening the conscience of the chancellor.” Id. (quoting 
J. POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 32 (4th ed. 1918)); see also Note, Practice and 
Potential of the Advisory Jury, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1987). 
 44.  Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 238, 240 (1893) (“But such verdict is not binding 
upon the judgment of the court. It is advisory simply, and the court may disregard it entirely, 
or adopt it either partially or in toto.”) (citations omitted). 
 45.  FED. R. CIV. P. 39 advisory committee’s note. But see 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra 
note 14, § 2331 (dating Rule 39’s adoption as 1938). 
 46.  FED. R. CIV. P. 39(c). 
 47.  As explained previously in note 13 supra, this figure undoubtedly understates the 
number of FTCA cases in which advisory juries have been used. 
 48.  See 2 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 20, § 16.08[2], at 16-55 (noting that 
the authorities on advisory juries “are relatively few and somewhat in conflict, but most take 
the view that an advisory jury is not improper”). 
 49.  See, e.g., Honeycutt v. United States, 19 F.R.D. 229, 230–31 (W.D. La. 1956) 
(holding that “Congress made this [bench-trial] provision mandatory, not permissive, and 
intended that no jury of any kind be used in [FTCA] cases”). 
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prohibiting jury trials to be dispositive and viewed an advisory jury as 
being of little use to the court in making its independent decision.50 
Proponents of advisory juries have since fared much better. 
Indeed, the vast majority of courts to address the issue have reasoned 
that they have the discretion to impanel an advisory jury.51 Opinions 
by other courts have similarly indicated that an advisory jury was 
available or actually used, without analyzing the propriety of doing 
so.52 However, none of the opinions allowing advisory juries has 
 
 50.  See Vincoy v. United States, No. CIV. 97-296JC/LFGACE, 1998 WL 1668877, at 
*3 (D.N.M. Dec. 28, 1998) (declining use of advisory jury because it “does not lessen [the] 
responsibility for deciding the Federal Tort Claims Act issues”); In re Air Crash Disaster, 619 
F. Supp. 13, 17 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (declining to exercise discretion to use an advisory jury 
because “the use of advisory juries in F.T.C.A. cases creates more problems than it solves”); 
Texasgulf Inc. v. Colt Elecs. Co., 615 F. Supp. 648, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting requested 
use of advisory jury because if it agrees with the court, its opinion “is of little use,” and if it 
disagrees with the court, “it would be impossible to give effect to it”); Latz v. Gallagher, 562 
F. Supp. 690, 693 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (finding an advisory jury unwarranted based upon a 
strict construction of the particular federal statutes at issue); Wright v. United States, 80 
F.R.D. 478, 479–80 (D. Mont. 1978) (exercising discretion not to impanel advisory jury 
because “if the verdict were consistent with [the judge’s] views, it would be of no assistance, 
and were it contrary, [the judge] would not know what effect to give it”). 
 51.  See, e.g., Coffland v. United States, 57 F.R.D. 209, 210 (N.D.W. Va. 1972); 
Poston v. United States, 262 F. Supp. 22, 23–24 (D. Haw. 1966), aff’d on other grounds, 396 
F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1968); see also Lerdahl v. Magill, Nos. Civ. A. 90-2306-L, 90-2307-L, 
1992 WL 40694, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 1992) (“The Court has power to utilize such an 
advisory jury in Federal Tort Claims Act cases and exercises its discretion to do so pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c).”). 
 52.  See, e.g., Presley v. U.S. Postal Service, 317 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2003); Newmann v. 
United States, 938 F.2d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir. 1991); Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 
869, 875 (6th Cir. 1990); Wooten v. United States, 825 F.2d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir. 1987); 
Serra v. Pichardo, 786 F.2d 237, 239 (6th Cir. 1986); In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 18 
n.3 (1st Cir. 1982); Stratis v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 682 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1982); Black v. 
United States, 421 F.2d 255, 256 (10th Cir. 1970); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 
F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1969); Garcia v. United States, 896 F. Supp. 467, 475 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 
1995); Palischak v. Allied Signal Aerospace Co., 893 F. Supp. 341, 352 (D.N.J. 1995); 
Robinson v. Alaska Prop. & Inv., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 1318, 1323 (D. Alaska 1995); Santa Fe 
Pac. Realty Corp. v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 687, 697 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Allen v. United 
States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 258 n.2 (D. Utah 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 
(10th Cir. 1987); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1256 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); Georges v. Hennessey, 545 F. Supp. 1264, 1265 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); 
Picariello v. Fenton, 491 F. Supp. 1026, 1027 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Lentz v. Freeman Assocs. 
Caribbean, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 892, 896 (D.V.I. 1977); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United 
States, 420 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (S.D. Ind. 1976); Moloney v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 
480, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Moyer v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 390, 391, 397 (S.D. Fla. 
1969); Moyer v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1235, 1236 (S.D. Fla. 1969), rev’d on other 
grounds, 481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973); Schetter v. Hous. Auth. of Erie, 132 F. Supp. 149, 
154 (W.D. Pa. 1955); see also Cox v. United States, 815 F.2d 76 (Table, 1987 WL 36441, at  
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satisfactorily addressed the statutory and congressional intent barriers  
to the use of such advisory panels, which is a shortcoming that 
deserves closer examination. 
III. ADVISORY JURIES, THE FTCA, AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
The responsibility for decisions under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
rests upon the court, and if the court accepts a jury’s advisory 
verdict which is contrary to the court’s own conclusion, then 
obviously the court has abdicated, and the jury, not the court, is 
the trier of fact.53 
In prohibiting jury trials in cases against the government under 
the FTCA, Congress was explicit: “[A]ny action against the United 
States under [the FTCA] shall be tried by the court without a 
jury . . . .”54 However, many federal district court judges have elected 
to use advisory juries because, in their view, an “advisory jury” is not 
the same as a “jury” for purposes of the FTCA.55 
To better understand the FTCA’s prohibition of jury trials, this 
Part examines the relationship among advisory juries, the FTCA, and 
the congressional intent underlying the Act. Subpart A argues that 
the use of advisory juries in FTCA cases is inconsistent with both the 
letter and spirit of the statutory mandate requiring district court 
judges to decide FTCA cases without a jury. Subpart B then argues 
that Congress intended for courts to decide FTCA cases on their 
own, without being influenced by the participation of any jury, 
whether it be a regular jury or an advisory jury. 
 
 
*3) (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1987); Stingley v. Raskey, No. A95-0242 CV (HRH), 1995 WL 
696591, at *7 (D. Alaska Nov. 20, 1995). 
 53.  Wright v. United States, 80 F.R.D. 478, 480 (D. Mont. 1978); see also Honeycutt 
v. United States, 19 F.R.D. 229, 231 (W.D. La. 1956) (concluding that impaneling an 
advisory jury “would be abdicating to a large degree the responsibility placed upon [the court] 
by Congress when it passed the Act”). 
 54.  28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 55.  See, e.g., Hamm v. Nasatka Barriers Inc., 166 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996). The 
court in Hamm found that an advisory jury would be “both helpful and appropriate,” pointing 
out that “[i]t is wholly within the Court’s discretion whether to accept or reject, in whole or in 
part, the verdicts of the advisory jury as they relate to the government, and ‘[t]he responsibility 
for the ultimate decision never shifts from the shoulders of the judge.’” Id. at 3 (quoting 
Poston, 262 F. Supp. at 24). 
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A. The Statutory Language Requires District Courts to Decide 
 FTCA Cases Without the Assistance of a Jury of Any Kind 
Because the FTCA provides that cases against the United States 
“shall be tried by the court without a jury,”56 it is beyond debate that 
the ultimate decision must be made by the court, rather than a 
jury.57 However, several courts have held that Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 39(c)58 gives them the discretion to use an “advisory” 
jury, as opposed to a “regular” jury.59 A closer examination reveals 
that Rule 39(c) does not so easily resolve the advisory jury issue. 
As a threshold matter, the attempted use of Rule 39(c) in an 
FTCA case conflicts with other provisions of law. For example, 
although not addressed in any published opinions relating to 
advisory juries, the use of Rule 39(c) to impanel an advisory jury in 
an FTCA case arguably abridges and modifies the United States’ 
substantive right to have its tort liability tried to a court without a 
jury in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.60 In addition, the 
FTCA’s prohibition of jury trials is a jurisdictional limitation.61 As a 
result, the attempted use of Rule 39(c) to impanel an advisory jury in 
an FTCA case violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82, which 
provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “shall not be 
construed to extend . . . the jurisdiction of the United States district 
courts.”62 
Beyond these non-FTCA obstacles, the use of advisory juries is 
even more problematic for reasons directly relating to the FTCA 
itself. For example, courts that impanel advisory juries usually 
advance one or more of several related explanations of why they are 
not violating the FTCA’s prohibition of jury trials. They primarily 
 
 56.  28 U.S.C. § 2402. 
 57.  See, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981) (“[I]n tort actions against 
the United States, . . . trials shall be to the court without a jury.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2402); 
Glasspool v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D. Del. 1961) (“The Federal Tort Claims 
Act . . . not only does not provide for a jury trial but absolutely forbids it.”). 
 58.  FED. R. CIV. P. 39(c) (“In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon 
motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury . . . .”). 
 59.  See, e.g., Hamm, 166 F.R.D. at 2–3. 
 60.  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994) (providing that the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”); Glasspool, 190 F. 
Supp. at 807 (stating that under the FTCA, the “jurisdiction is limited to a trial by the Court 
without a jury”). 
 61.  See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 62.  FED. R. CIV. P. 82. 
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emphasize that the court alone will make the final decision, not the 
advisory jury, and that the court is free “to accept or reject, in whole 
or in part, the verdicts of the advisory jury as they relate to the 
government.”63 These courts further contend that “[a]n advisory 
jury is an optional aid to an independent court, not the factfinder or 
decision-maker. . . . An advisory verdict has no force, other than 
persuasive, on the court, which remains the sole and final decision-
maker.”64 
On their face, these justifications seem logical. If the court, 
rather than the advisory jury, makes the final decision, there has been 
no direct violation of the FTCA’s prohibition of jury trials. Upon 
deeper consideration, however, the proffered justifications are 
unsatisfactory for several reasons, all of which relate to the issue of 
independence in judicial decision making. 
First, from a strict textual approach focused on preserving the 
court’s independence, the judge would be required to forego any 
input from any another fact-finder, which in this case would be the 
advisory jury. In other words, if a court were to solicit and receive an 
advisory jury verdict, the court would essentially negate its 
independence in deciding the case. Therefore, under this view, an 
advisory jury could have no role in a truly independent judicial 
decision. 
Some courts have recognized the above challenge that an 
advisory jury poses to genuinely independent decision making. For 
example, in In re Air Crash Disaster,65 the court was charged with 
resolving the contribution claims among the United States and two 
private co-defendants after the plaintiffs in the airplane accident case 
had already reached a settlement.66 The question arose whether the 
jury already impaneled for the private defendants should also serve as 
 
 63.  Hamm, 166 F.R.D. at 3; see also Poston v. United States, 262 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D. 
Haw. 1966) (“[T]he responsibility for the ultimate decision as to liability of the United States 
never shifts from the shoulders of the judge, just as though the advice of the jury were not 
sought.”), aff’d on other grounds, 396 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1968) (citing (Am.) Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co. of Ill. v. Timms & Howard, Inc., 108 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1939)); Lee Hancock, 
Davidians’ Attorney Vents Anger at Judge: Appeal Now Planned in Wrongful Death Suit, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 2000, at 25A (quoting Waco district court judge who 
cautioned attorneys that “if you don’t think I’ve got the guts to disregard this jury verdict, 
you’re wrong”). 
 64.  Hamm, 166 F.R.D. at 3. 
 65.  619 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 
 66.  See id. at 14–15. 
ZAB-FIN 2/15/2003 2:23 PM 
185] Advisory Juries 
 199 
an advisory jury as to the claims against the United States under the 
FTCA.67 
Recognizing that “the Court, not the jury, must determine the 
liability of the United States under the F.T.C.A.,” the judge rejected 
the invitation to use an advisory jury: “If the advisory jury’s opinion 
were consistent with mine, it would not be very useful. On the other 
hand, if the advisory jury’s verdict differed from mine, I would have 
difficulty giving effect to it.”68 Therefore, although the private parties 
were entitled to a jury trial on the issues between them, the FTCA 
case was tried to the court without the jury serving in an advisory 
capacity. 
Similarly, in Wright v. United States,69 because a jury was already 
present to hear the case against private third-party defendants, the 
plaintiffs requested that it be used as an advisory jury as to the FTCA 
claims against the United States. While recognizing that it arguably 
had the discretion to impanel an advisory jury, the court declined to 
do so for the inherently logical reason that “if the verdict were 
consistent with my views, it would be of no assistance, and were it 
contrary, I would not know what effect to give it.”70 Thus, as these 
courts recognized, to be genuinely faithful to the FTCA’s 
prohibition of jury trials, a court that had chosen to impanel an 
advisory jury would then be statutorily required to ignore it.71 
 
 
 67.  See id. at 16–17. 
 68.  Id. at 17; see also Texasgulf Inc. v. Colt Elecs. Co., 615 F. Supp. 648, 659–60 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting requested use of advisory jury). 
 69.  80 F.R.D. 478, 479 (D. Mont. 1978). 
 70.  Id. at 479–80. The court also reiterated that the “responsibility for decisions under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act rests upon the court” and expressed the view that “calling an 
advisory jury in a Federal Tort Claims case creates more problems than it solves.” Id. at 480. 
 71.  Gragg v. City of Omaha, 812 F. Supp. 991 (D. Neb. 1993), is a case where the 
court chose to use an advisory jury and then disregarded that jury’s verdict. Id. at 993. In 
Gragg, which involved a wrongful-death suit against an off-duty police officer, only the first of 
the plaintiffs’ two theories of recovery was entitled to be heard by a jury. Id. at 991–92. The 
court nevertheless used the jury in an advisory capacity on the second issue, which was to be 
decided by the court. Id. at 992. Although the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs 
on the second issue, the court recognized its duty to make an independent decision on the 
merits: “While I believe a reasonable jury could reach the same conclusion this jury came to in 
finding [the defendant] negligent, as the fact finder I disagree with the jury’s verdict, and, 
accordingly, I find in favor of the defendants.” Id. at 993. The independence demonstrated by 
the court is commendable; however, it begs the question of why the court initially elected to 
use an advisory jury when it knew it would have to disregard the advisory jury’s verdict. 
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A second view of the role of advisory juries would be to allow an 
advisory jury to participate in the judicial decision, but, allegedly, 
only in a way that does not violate the FTCA’s prohibition of jury 
trials. This construction is used in most cases that allow advisory 
juries. Under this interpretation, the advisory jury “has no force, 
other than persuasive, on the court, which remains the sole and final 
decision-maker.”72 Rather, the advisory jury verdict is viewed as 
merely one piece of information to be considered by the court in 
arriving at its independent decision.73 
This construction of the role of advisory juries is problematic on 
several levels. If a court allows itself to be swayed even in part by an 
advisory jury’s decision, the court has allowed a “jury,” albeit an 
advisory one, to participate in deciding the United States’ liability 
under the FTCA. Moreover, if the court considers the advisory jury 
verdict as a piece of evidence or data in deciding the case, the United 
States has been denied the opportunity to cross-examine that piece 
of evidence to test its reliability.74 
On this point, a court using an advisory jury would be quick to 
point out that, because the jury serves only in an advisory role, the 
court is “free to ignore any or all of the jury’s findings.”75 Courts are 
 
 72.  Hamm v. Nasatka Barriers Inc., 166 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 73.  See Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 988 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (“The 
verdict of such an advisory panel is only part of the data taken into consideration in arriving at 
the court’s independent conclusion.”), aff’d as modified, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978); 
Hamm, 166 F.R.D. at 3 (“[A]n advisory verdict might well be a useful additional source of 
information for the Court.”). 
 74.  See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 
32 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974) (describing cross-examination as “the greatest 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth”). When a court considers an advisory jury 
verdict as a piece of evidence, the government has been precluded from testing whether it is 
founded on a valid basis or whether it is the product of prejudice, misunderstanding, or even 
means as arbitrary as the flip of a coin. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil Jury 
in Historical Perspective, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 201, 209 (1998) (stating that although juries are 
“not supposed to toss a coin or decide cases on the basis of prejudice or sympathy, there is 
absolutely nothing to prevent the jury from doing any or all of these things”). 
 75.  Hamm, 166 F.R.D. at 3. The district court judge in the Waco trial expressed 
similar sentiments. See Lee Hancock, Jurors Side with U.S. in Waco Siege, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, July 15, 2000, at 1A (quoting judge as saying “A jury makes a decision. The jury 
advises the court. I can take its advice or I can reject it. I consider their verdict to the extent 
that I want to.”); Milloy, supra note 3 (quoting district court judge as reminding lawyers 
involved that “It’s important for everyone to understand that [the advisory jury’s] decision is in 
no way binding. I intend to consider the advice of the jury, but by law I cannot be bound by 
it.”). 
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undeniably free to do so. In fact, a fair reading of the FTCA requires 
them to ignore the advisory jury’s verdict if it conflicts with that of 
the court. However, justifying the use of an advisory jury on the 
basis that a court is free to disregard its verdict elevates form over 
both reality and practice. 
First, an advisory jury almost certainly will have some persuasive 
effect on the court’s decision.76 Even the courts that have used 
advisory juries concede that the advisory jury verdict is “taken into 
consideration”77 and has a “persuasive” effect on the court’s 
decision.78 Therefore, even if the advisory jury has merely influenced 
or persuaded the court in its decision, the use of an advisory jury has 
compromised the spirit of the FTCA’s prohibition of jury trials: 
While advisory juries are now fairly common, it is far from clear 
how they can be useful if § 2402 [the FTCA’s prohibition of jury 
trials] is to be respected. If the judge allows himself to be 
influenced by the jury, a result contrary to § 2402 would appear to 
obtain.79 
Of potentially more significance is the idea that, even if the court 
considers the advisory jury verdict merely as an additional piece of 
information, the verdict nevertheless has the potential of changing 
the outcome of the case. This concern was recognized and addressed 
in Wright,80 in which the court declined an invitation to impanel an 
advisory jury: 
It may be that the court could use an advisory verdict if the 
advisory verdict were to be treated as evidence and weighed with 
the other evidence before a decision were reached. Perhaps in such 
a case there is no abdication of the court’s responsibility, but it is 
not entirely clear. If, absent a jury verdict, the court would have 
reached a contrary conclusion, who has really decided the case?81 
 
 
 76.  See, e.g., Michelle Mittelstadt, Jury’s Findings Reverberate Across Capital, Country, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 15, 2000, at 21A (“While the jurors’ recommendation isn’t 
binding, the judge is expected to take it into account in crafting his verdict.”). 
 77.  Birnbaum, 436 F. Supp. at 988. 
 78.  Hamm, 166 F.R.D. at 3; see also id. (“[A]n advisory verdict might well be a useful 
additional source of information for the Court.”). 
 79.  2 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 20, § 16.08[2], at 12-56 to 12-58. 
 80.  Wright v. United States, 80 F.R.D. 478 (D. Mont. 1978). 
 81.  Id. at 480 (footnote omitted). 
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This question is particularly important in close cases in which the 
outcome could legitimately go either way. In those instances, the 
concern is whether the district court judge will have the requisite 
inclination and fortitude to reject an advisory jury verdict in favor of 
the court’s independent decision, particularly when no one other 
than the judge would be aware of the judge/jury dissonance.82 That 
the advisory jury need not have been impaneled in the first instance 
makes the judge’s quandary in such situations even more regrettable. 
Whatever the actual decision-making process, the perception of 
litigants and the public is often that the court will likely follow the 
advisory jury’s verdict. For instance, in the Waco/Branch Davidian 
trial, after the advisory jury had returned its verdict, but before the 
judge had issued his decision, the lead plaintiffs’ attorney conceded 
that “I understand the judge has his decision to make and the jury is 
advisory, but I think from a practical matter, we would recognize 
that there will be no judgment against the government . . . . I 
wouldn’t be foolish enough to suggest otherwise.”83 
The public’s view that a judge will side with an advisory jury is 
not unfounded. Having gone to the trouble of impaneling an 
 
 82.  Posing these concerns in no way suggests that courts are insincere when expressing 
their decision-making independence and willingness to disregard an advisory jury verdict that 
conflicts with their own view of the case. For instance, in the known FTCA cases in which an 
advisory jury was actually used, judges have sometimes altered or reversed the advisory jury 
verdict. See, e.g., Newmann v. United States, 938 F.2d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting 
that “[a]n advisory jury returned a verdict for the United States, but the trial court rejected 
that verdict”); Gallardo v. United States, 697 F. Supp. 1243, 1245 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting 
advisory jury verdict in favor of the United States); Moloney v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 
480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (agreeing with advisory jury’s finding of defendant negligence but 
nevertheless holding that contributory negligence barred plaintiff’s recovery); Moyer v. United 
States, 306 F. Supp. 390, 397 (S.D. Fla. 1969).  
However, a court’s natural inclination to conform its judgment to that of a jury is 
evident in Moyer, where the district court noted that its decision in favor of the United States 
“may be regrettable because it not only goes contrary to the findings of [an advisory] jury 
(which, however, I feel was largely the result of sympathy) but, also, deprives plaintiff and her 
children of a substantial recovery.” 306 F. Supp. at 397. 
 83.  Tommy Witherspoon, Jury: Feds Not Liable, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, July 15, 2000, 
at 1A. Other commentators similarly expressed confidence that the judge would follow the 
advisory jury’s verdict. See Ganey, supra note 5 (stating that “[t]he jury will consider whether 
the government is liable for damages; [the judge] could overrule its findings but probably 
won’t be inclined to do so”); William H. Freivogel, Advisory Jury Rejects Davidians’ Wrongful 
Death Lawsuit, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 15, 2000, at 15 (stating that “both sides 
expect [the judge] to agree with the jury”); Milloy, supra note 3 (noting that “[l]awyers 
involved in the case today said they could not recall an instance in which a judge overruled a 
jury’s advisory finding”). 
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advisory jury, a judge is unlikely to then completely ignore the jury’s 
verdict: 
 Because an advisory jury trial is tried formally before the bench, 
the judge is free to disregard the advisory jury’s findings. In 
practice, however, a judge who believes it worthwhile to empanel 
such a jury will likely find it worthwhile to listen to what that jury 
has to say.84 
In any event, a district court’s inclination to share some of the 
decision-making responsibility with an advisory jury is 
understandable. Despite their life tenure, federal district court judges 
are sometimes called upon to make extraordinarily controversial, or 
at least very difficult, decisions regarding the federal government’s 
interaction with private citizens in FTCA cases. The Waco/Branch 
Davidian trial, which involved allegations that the federal 
government had intentionally or negligently killed eighty of its 
citizens, is only one example.85 It should not be surprising, therefore, 
that judges might seek to share responsibility for a difficult decision 
with a panel of citizen-jurors. 
However, to be faithful to the FTCA’s requirement that such 
cases “be tried by the court without a jury,” a district court must 
resist the temptation to use an advisory jury. At best, an advisory jury 
requires the creation and use of a judicial fiction that the judge is not 
really using the advisory jury verdict in a manner inconsistent with 
the FTCA’s prohibition of the use of juries. At worst, by using an 
advisory jury to effectively decide an FTCA case, a federal court 
“would be abdicating to a large degree the responsibility placed 
upon [it] by Congress when it passed the [FTCA].”86 Either way, it 
is clear that the FTCA’s statutory prohibition of jury trials does not 
allow a court to use an advisory jury. 
 
 84.  Note, supra note 43, at 1365. It is interesting to note that a study evaluating 
decision making by judges and juries in 4000 civil trials determined that the judge and jury 
would have come to the same conclusion on liability seventy-eight percent of the time, and 
would have come to different conclusions twenty-two percent of the time. See HARRY KALVEN, 
JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63–64 (1966); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the 
Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (1964) (reporting the rate of judge/jury agreement as 
seventy-nine percent in personal injury cases); see also VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, 
JUDGING THE JURY 117 (1986). Even in cases where both the judge and the jury would have 
found for the plaintiffs, the study revealed that the jury awards were, on average, twenty 
percent higher than those of the judge. See Kalven, supra, at 1065. 
 85.  Andrade v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 778 (W.D. Tex. 2000). 
 86.  Honeycutt v. United States, 19 F.R.D. 229, 231 (W.D. La. 1956). 
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B. The Use of Advisory Juries in FTCA Cases Is Inconsistent with 
Congress’s Intent in Prohibiting Jury Trials Against the United States 
Apart from conflicting with the FTCA’s statutory language, the 
use of an advisory jury also clashes with Congress’s intent that a 
court sit without a jury when hearing FTCA actions against the 
United States. This incompatibility with congressional intent is 
evident from both the jurisdictional nature of the FTCA’s 
prohibition on jury trials and the available evidence in the legislative 
history. 
When the United States has waived its sovereign immunity from 
suit, as it did with the FTCA, the “limitations and conditions upon 
which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed 
and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.”87 Therefore, when 
interpreting statutes such as the FTCA that waive the sovereign 
immunity of the United States, courts should be careful to construe 
them in a manner that gives effect to congressional intent.88 
The available legislative history is revealing. One of the reasons 
for passing the FTCA was the pre-existing lack of uniformity in 
considering private congressional bills for relief: “Under the existing 
practice, there is lacking uniformity of action from one Congress to 
another. Discrimination among applicants for relief thereby 
 
 87.  Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981) (quoting Soriano v. United States, 
352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957)); see Koehler v. United States, 153 F.3d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(“[N]o suit may be maintained against the United States unless the suit is brought in exact 
compliance with the terms of a statute under which the sovereign has consented to be sued.”). 
Significantly, the prohibition of jury trials in FTCA cases is a jurisdictional limitation; 
indeed, Congress included this limitation in the section that defined the FTCA’s jurisdictional 
grant. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 843–44 (1946) 
(“Subject to the provisions of this title, the United States district court for the district wherein 
the plaintiff is resident or wherein the act or omission occurred, . . . sitting without a jury, shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any claim against the 
United States.”). As originally codified, the FTCA (which was Title IV of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act) appeared at 28 U.S.C. §§ 921–946. The 1948 code revision resulted in 
the separation and scattering of the FTCA’s provisions among different parts of the judicial 
code. See 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 20, § 2.13, at 2-72 to 2-73. This 
recodification of the FTCA, however, effected no substantive change in the law. See Finley v. 
United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989). 
 88.  See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203 (1993) (quoting United States v. 
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1979)) (Courts “should not take it upon [themselves] to 
extend the waiver [of sovereign immunity] beyond that which Congress intended . . . [nor] 
should [courts] assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended.”). 
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results.”89 By requiring all litigants to adhere to the same set of 
statutory provisions,90 including the requirement of non-jury bench 
trials,91 the FTCA imposed a template of uniformity on tort claims 
against the government. Whether one agrees or disagrees with 
Congress’s preference for bench trials, the standard is at least the 
same for all plaintiffs.92 The selective use of advisory juries in some 
cases and not others needlessly works against this uniformity by 
introducing an element of inequality into the system. 
Even more significantly, the legislative history demonstrates that 
Congress chose bench trials over jury trials because it recognized 
that juries would have difficulty viewing the United States as a 
defendant without being influenced by the fact that it has a deeper 
pocket than any other defendant:93 
There are advantages in trial before the court without a jury . . . . 
[I]nasmuch as the Government is the defendant and the money 
comes out of the Treasury, the juries will decide cases with their 
hearts rather than their heads, just as they do when an insurance 
company is the defendant, so the awards in jury trials would 
probably be much larger, in view of the sympathy the jurors might 
have, than they would be in trials before the court. If these cases 
are to be tried by the Federal Courts, they should be court trials 
rather than jury trials, in my opinion.94 
 
 89.  H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 3 (1926), quoted in 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra 
note 20, § 2.08, at 2-50. 
 90.  See, e.g., supra notes 31–38 and accompanying text. 
 91.  28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing that “any action against the 
United States under [the FTCA] shall be tried by the court without a jury”). 
 92.  Indeed, in certain cases, such as when the plaintiff or his theory of recovery is 
politically or socially unpopular, it might be preferable for the United States as a litigant to 
have its liability determined by a jury, rather than the court. However, Congress expressly 
chose the uniform standard of having the United States’ liability under the FTCA determined 
by federal judges, rather than juries, regardless of whether a judge or jury would benefit the 
United States or a plaintiff in a particular case. 
 93.  Members of Congress who opposed general tort legislation “feared that the 
Government would be made the victim of ambulance chasing, exaggerated or fraudulent 
claims, and emotionalism in verdicts.” 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 20, § 2.08, at 2-
51; see also id. (“If you throw down the bars [precluding tort suits against the government] 
you might make the sovereign, which in this country is the people, liable not only for hundreds 
of millions but billions of dollars, which might threaten the life of the sovereign and the very 
existence of the Government.”) (quoting 69 CONG. REC. 2191 (1928) (statement of Rep. 
Ramseyer)). 
 94.  92 CONG. REC. 10,092 (1946) (statement of Rep. Scrivner); see also S. REP. NO. 
79-1400, at 32 (1946) (“The trial will be without a jury as is now the case in suits under the 
ZAB-FIN 2/15/2003 2:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
206 
Subsequent illustration of this concern appears in the legislative 
history underlying a 1954 amendment to the statute prohibiting jury 
trials in FTCA cases. This amendment exempted certain tax cases 
against the United States from the non-jury rule.95 In explaining the 
legislation, the House of Representatives Committee Report noted 
that the “primary objection to granting jury trials in suits against the 
United States is that juries, in considering possible sums to be 
awarded the plaintiff, might tend to be overly generous because of 
the virtually unlimited ability of the Government to pay the 
verdict.”96 
This concern about excessive jury verdicts seems inherently 
logical, and remains equally valid today. For example, in Lehman v. 
Nakshian,97 which involved the availability of jury trials in cases 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Supreme 
Court illuminated Congress’s purpose in opting for bench trials in 
cases in which the United States is the defendant. The Court first 
observed that “[w]hen Congress has waived the sovereign immunity 
of the United States, it has almost always conditioned that waiver 
upon a plaintiff’s relinquishing any claim to a jury trial.”98 The Court 
then noted that “[i]t is not difficult to appreciate Congress’ [sic] 
reluctance to provide for jury trials against the United States.”99 As 
an example, the Court explained that in permitting a narrow 
 
Tucker Act.”). Also, in assessing the newly enacted Federal Tort Claims Act the same year of 
its passage in 1946, a commentator noted that “one reason, probably the most cogent, for not 
permitting juries in suits under [Acts allowing suit against the government], was to prevent the 
United States from being overtaxed and mulcted by the sentiment of a jury which might give 
exorbitant verdicts far beyond the claimant’s just dessert.” Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal Tort 
Claims Act—A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 17–18 n.53 (1946) (citing Hearings 
Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 20 (1940); 92 CONG. 
REC. 10,143 (1946)). 
The concern that jurors might not be overly sympathetic to the plight of the federal 
government was present in the Waco/Branch Davidian litigation. For example, one of the 
United States’ trial attorneys noted that facing an advisory jury was a daunting task because of 
“the large amount of negative publicity the government had received over the years” relating 
to the events at Waco and “because so many children had died in the fire.” Fisk, supra note 6. 
 95.  Pub. L. No. 83-559, 68 Stat. 589, 674 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 346(a), 2402 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)). In making this exception, it was recognized that it 
would be “the first time jury trials would be permitted in suits against the Government.” 1954 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2716, 2718. 
 96. 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2716, 2718. 
 97.  453 U.S. 156 (1981). 
 98.  Id. at 161. 
 99.  Id. at 161 n.8. 
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exception allowing jury trials in tax refund cases, “Congress 
expressed its concern that juries ‘might tend to be overly generous 
because of the virtually unlimited ability of the Government to pay 
the verdict.’”100 This concern is heightened in tort cases against the 
government, which frequently involve personal injury or death 
allegedly caused by governmental negligence.101 
By enacting the FTCA, Congress sought to provide a uniform, 
fair system for adjudicating tort claims against the United States. 
However, the use of advisory juries undermines that congressional 
intent, both by disrupting the otherwise uniform requirement of 
bench trials and by permitting jurors to pass judgment on the 
ultimate deep pocket of the federal government. As such, advisory 
juries have no rightful place in the FTCA statutory scheme 
envisioned by Congress. 
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND SYSTEMIC COSTS OF USING 
ADVISORY JURIES IN FTCA CASES 
It seems to me that calling an advisory jury in a Federal Tort 
Claims case creates more problems than it solves . . . .102 
An advisory jury may seem innocuous and even appealing to a 
trial judge. The judge may view the impaneling of an advisory jury as 
an opportunity to gain valuable insight into a case at no cost to the 
judge, who may accept or reject the advisory jury’s verdict at will. As 
is so often the case, however, appearances can be deceiving. 
Experience has shown that advisory juries require additional outlays 
of time and procedural steps, such as voir dire, opening statements, 
jury instructions, and the like, that are unnecessary or greatly 
reduced when the court hears an FTCA case without a jury, whether 
advisory or not. 
 
 100.  Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 83-659, at 3 (1953)); see also Matthews v. CTI 
Container Transp. Int’l, Inc., 871 F.2d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that “suits against the 
United States, ‘are sui generis,’ and while they are allowed by statute in some instances, e.g. 
under the . . . Federal Tort Claims Act, . . . the sovereign . . . is not subjected to the ‘great 
vicissitudes of jury trial’”) (quoting Ruggiero v. Compania Peruana De Vapores, 639 F.2d 
872, 881 (2d Cir. 1981)); Ruggiero, 639 F.2d at 880 (“Surely one reason why the United 
States has coupled its waiver of sovereign immunity in certain types of cases with a refusal to 
submit itself to jury trial was the fear that juries might draw too heavily on a deep pocket.”). 
 101.  See, e.g., supra notes 28–29. 
 102.  Wright v. United States, 80 F.R.D. 478, 480 (D. Mont. 1978). 
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In an effort to assist federal district courts and practicing 
attorneys, this Part examines the practical considerations and 
consequences of using an advisory jury, at times using the 
Waco/Branch Davidian civil trial103 as an illustrative example. 
Subpart A discusses the additional time, expense, and procedures 
required in impaneling and presenting a case to an advisory jury. 
Subpart B then examines the influence of an advisory jury on the 
presentations made at trial. Subpart C argues that the use of advisory 
juries generates systemic costs with regard to citizens’ participation as 
jurors and their perceptions of jury service. Finally, subpart D 
considers the heightened risks and potential benefits of using 
advisory juries in high-profile cases. 
A. The Additional Time and Expense of Advisory Juries 
Despite their intended use as an aid to district court judges, 
advisory juries typically present the court with additional challenges 
that significantly decrease the court’s efficiency. For instance, jury 
trials take significantly longer than bench trials, up to twice as 
long.104 
In part because they are longer, jury trials are also significantly 
more expensive than bench trials.105 The increased length of jury 
 
 103.  See Andrade v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 778 (W.D. Tex. 2000). 
 104.  See Kalven, supra note 84, at 1059–60 & n.12 (estimating that jury trials are one-
and-a-half times as long as bench trials); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law 
of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1491 (1999) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 193 n.1 (1996)) (suggesting that in federal courts, “civil 
jury trials are on average more than twice as long as civil bench (that is, judge) trials”); see also 
Peter W. Culley, In Defense of Civil Juries, 35 ME. L. REV. 17, 26–27 (1983) (“No one would 
seriously dispute that a jury trial can be time-consuming when compared to a bench trial” and 
that trial by jury has been advocated “in spite of its being a relatively expensive and time-
consuming method of dispute resolution.”); Patrick E. Longan, The Case for Jury Fees in 
Federal Civil Litigation, 74 OR. L. REV. 909, 930 (1995) (noting that “jury trials inherently 
take longer than nonjury trials”). 
As early as 1946, a congressman debating the passage of the FTCA argued that “[t]here 
are advantages in trial before the court without a jury, namely, that the cases can be much 
more expeditiously handled than they can in the case of a jury trial.” 92 CONG. REC. 10,092 
(1946) (statement of Rep. Scrivner); see also William H. Levit et al., Expediting Voir Dire: An 
Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 916, 920 (1971) (“Jury trials are lengthier and more 
expensive than court trials.”). 
 105.  See Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1424 (1997) 
(“The claim that jury trials are more expensive than bench trials is perhaps the only truism in 
the debates surrounding the civil jury.”); JAMES S. KAKALIK & ABBY EISENSHTAT ROBYN, 
COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES 
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trials also increases attorneys’ fees and expenses for the parties and 
creates longer delays for other litigants waiting for access to the 
courts. Although efficiency is only one of many goals in adjudicating 
disputes in the federal courts,106 the additional time and expense of 
advisory jury trials on already-crowded court dockets is significant.107 
In contrast to a jury trial, a bench trial can be a remarkably more 
efficient means of conducting a trial. First, because it does not 
involve the logistical complications associated with multiple citizen-
jurors, a bench trial can be scheduled in and around the court’s other 
business. Once it begins, a judge can recess a bench trial for days, 
weeks, or more while attending to other pressing court business.108 
With a jury trial, in contrast, a court generally must dedicate a 
continuous block of time for completion of the entire trial109 due to 
jurors’ schedules and concerns about jurors’ retention of evidence 
already presented. 
Likewise, in a bench trial a judge can employ several tools to 
expedite and streamline the presentation of evidence. For example, 
 
xviii, xix (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1982) (quantifying higher government expenditures 
for jury trials than for non-jury bench trials). 
Jury trials generate costs relating to juror fees, meals, transportation, security, and court 
personnel to administer and supervise jury panels. Jurors and their employers also bear 
significant costs, considering the modest $40 daily juror attendance fee, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1871(b)(1) (1994), and employers’ loss of work while their employees are serving as jurors. 
See Longan, supra note 104, at 928–29; William R. Pabst, Jr. & G. Thomas Munsterman, The 
Economic Hardship of Jury Duty, 58 JUDICATURE 494, 496–98 (1975) (describing economic 
costs to employees and employers of jury service). Beyond monetary costs, jurors’ personal 
lives are often disrupted by their service. Longan, supra note 104, at 929; Pabst & 
Munsterman, supra, at 496; Developments in the Law, supra, at 1425. 
 106.  For example, FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 states that the federal rules 
should be “construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.” 
 107.  See O’Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577, 581 (N.D. Ill. 
1960) (warning that “[c]ourt congestion is a critical problem which strikes at the heart of the 
administration of justice”); Note, supra note 43, at 1368–69 (noting that the “problem of case 
backlog in federal courts is serious enough that even a modest increase in trial time is 
potentially significant”). Jury trials, because their results are less predictable than bench trials, 
may also discourage pre-trial settlement of cases, thus exacerbating court congestion. See 
George L. Priest, Justifying the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM  
103, 131–32 (Robert E. Litan ed. 1993). 
 108.  See John Zebrowski, Judge or Jury: The Judge’s Perspective, LITIG., Fall 1994, at 28, 
31 (describing relative ease of scheduling non-jury bench trials). 
 109.  See id. (describing difficulties of scheduling jury trials); AM Int’l v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 648 F. Supp. 506, 509 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that “a bench trial is easier to schedule 
and may be spread over a longer period while a jury trial requires a block of continuous time”). 
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opening statements and closing arguments are often significantly 
reduced in time, submitted in written form, or eliminated altogether 
in a bench trial. With an advisory jury, opening statements and 
closing arguments are usually necessary to introduce and summarize 
the evidence for the jurors. Also, the selection of an advisory jury is 
usually accomplished through voir dire and direct and peremptory 
challenges, which are not necessary in a bench trial.110 
In civil bench trials, a considerable amount of testimony typically 
is introduced through deposition transcripts rather than by live 
testimony, thus saving trial time. With an advisory jury, however, 
litigants are likely to reevaluate this approach. Because it is 
customarily thought to be more persuasive to a jury to present 
witnesses live at trial rather than through written deposition 
testimony, litigants may choose to call more of their witnesses to 
testify live, thus extending the length of trials.111 
Due to the perceived importance of preventing an advisory jury 
from hearing prejudicial hearsay or other improper evidence, the 
presence of an advisory jury may also increase the number of 
evidentiary objections by counsel and the resulting need for rulings 
by the trial judge.112 In contrast, evidentiary rulings in bench trials 
 
 110.  See Zebrowski, supra note 108, at 31–32; Longan, supra note 104, at 929–30; 
O’Donnell, 183 F. Supp. at 583 (outlining the various additional procedures required by jury 
trials); Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal 
Jury, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 335 (1988) (underscoring that “jury trials involve a 
number of time-consuming features not associated with a bench trial, including the voir dire 
process, pre- and mid-trial conferences regarding the admissibility of evidence, and the judge’s 
charge to the jury”). Also, the presentation of expert and other testimony is often more 
streamlined in a bench trial, in part due to “the expanded freedom of judges to question either 
counsel or the witnesses.” See Zebrowski, supra note 108, at 32 (noting that in non-jury trials 
the “presentation of expert testimony is often easier, shorter, and perhaps cheaper than in a 
jury trial”). 
 111.  Whatever the amount of testimony submitted by written deposition, the process of 
doing so is different in bench trials and jury trials. In a bench trial, the presentation of 
deposition testimony can be accomplished by excerpting and submitting the relevant portions 
to the court in written form. Once submitted, the transcripts can be reviewed by the court at a 
convenient time and place—often in chambers—thus saving trial time. A jury trial, in contrast, 
usually requires the comparatively time-consuming practice of having the lawyers read aloud 
the deposition transcripts in open court, or playing the deposition videotapes for the jury, both 
of which consume considerable trial time. 
With an advisory jury, there is also a need to carefully screen such deposition transcripts 
for hearsay and other objections to unreliable evidence that the court, as the trier of fact, 
would not credit but might influence the jury. 
 112.  In a typical jury trial, jury instructions are frequently the subject of appellate 
challenge and review. In an advisory jury trial, in contrast, since the jury is acting in only a non-
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are usually less frequent and contentious because counsel can assume 
that the trial judge will consider the proffered evidence only for its 
appropriate evidentiary value.113 
The presence of a jury—even an advisory one—also requires the 
parties to submit proposed jury instructions and verdict forms. The 
judge must then consider these proposals, often after a hearing 
where counsel argue the merits of competing instructions. In a 
bench trial, proposed instructions and verdict forms are unnecessary 
because the court simply decides the case by entering findings of fact 
and conclusions of law.114 By using an advisory jury, therefore, the 
court introduces an additional, and often contentious, procedure 
into what would otherwise be a relatively straightforward bench 
trial.115 
 
binding “advisory” capacity, an otherwise reversible error in the jury instructions would not 
justify reversal on appeal. See Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F.2d 1431, 1438 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (stating that “there can be no review of supposed errors relating to rulings before 
and instructions to the advisory jury”) (quoting 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, 
§ 2335); Poston v. United States, 262 F. Supp. 22, 24 (D. Haw. 1966) (stating that 
“specifications of error relating to rulings on evidence before an advisory jury and instructions 
to that jury need not be considered on appeal, because the function of that jury is to assist the 
judge”), aff’d on other grounds, 396 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1968). 
Therefore, while a judge must typically be very cautious in instructing a regular jury, he 
or she may instruct an advisory jury in any conceivable way—or even fail to instruct the jury at 
all—and still avoid reversal on appeal. See Note, supra note 43, at 1365 (stating that the 
“invisibility of the advisory jury on appeal allows the trial judge to be informal, experimental, 
or even sloppy with the advisory jury without risk of reversible error”); see also MOORE ET AL., 
supra note 43, ¶ 39.43, at 39–92. Of course, inadequate or inappropriate jury instructions may 
reduce the value of the advisory verdict by increasing the chances that it is based on invalid or 
improper grounds. 
 113.  Even if the frequency of objections does not increase, the resolution of evidentiary 
objections in a jury trial is usually more cumbersome and time-consuming. See Longan, supra 
note 104, at 930 (noting that “[e]videntiary disputes are also likely to take more time in a jury 
trial” than in a non-jury trial). Objections in a jury trial often require the lawyers to assemble at 
the bench to discuss the issue with the judge outside the hearing of the jury. Extended 
discussions of evidentiary issues are even more time-consuming, as they require the temporary 
removal of the jury from the courtroom. These procedures are in contrast to the comparatively 
efficient discussion and resolution of evidentiary issues as they arise in a bench trial. 
 114.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). With an advisory jury, the parties’ obligation to develop 
and submit proposed jury instructions and verdict forms is typically in addition to, rather than 
in lieu of, the need to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the 
district court is still required by FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(a) to enter findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, courts often request or require the parties to submit proposed 
findings and conclusions. 
 115.  It should be noted that “many judges report that bench trials require far more 
concentration and effort on the part of the trial judge.” Paula L. Hannaford et al., How Judges 
View Civil Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 247, 250 (1998) (describing burdens of trial judge in 
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The Waco/Branch Davidian case provides a concrete example of 
several of the foregoing considerations. The district court judge 
assigned to hear the case was already intimately familiar with the 
complicated facts of the case, having presided over the criminal trial 
involving the death of four ATF agents as well as several other 
lawsuits arising from the incidents at Waco.116 Accordingly, both the 
Davidian plaintiffs and the United States were able to prepare for 
trial knowing that the judge was already very familiar with the facts 
of the case. The parties were thus able to focus and streamline their 
presentation of evidence accordingly. 
The district court’s decision to impanel an advisory jury, which 
came three weeks before trial was to begin, changed this assumption. 
The conversion from a bench trial to a jury trial forced the litigants 
to consider the use of additional witnesses, evidence, and exhibits to 
explain the case to the advisory jurors, who, unlike the judge, were 
relatively unfamiliar with the evidence.117 
Other steps were also necessary. After the panel of prospective 
jurors was assembled, the judge and the attorneys conducted voir 
dire and the attorneys made direct and peremptory challenges. Once 
the advisory jury was selected and impaneled, both parties made 
opening statements. During the course of the trial, portions of 
twenty-three depositions were read aloud in open court or played in 
videotaped format, both of which consumed considerable trial 
time.118 
 
handling the various aspects of a trial). Of concern here is whether judges can avoid the 
reduced attentiveness inherent in presiding over a jury trial when they choose to use an 
advisory jury. If not, this may cause a subtle shift of the fact-finding task in advisory jury trials 
from the district court to the advisory jury that would violate the FTCA’s prohibition of jury 
trials. 
 116.  See United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1996); Hancock, No-Nonsense 
Style, supra note 3. 
 117.  See Mark England, Davidian Jury May Not Have Last Word, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, 
June 4, 2000, at 1A (quoting government attorney as saying “I think we will have to present 
some more information [at trial] because the judge has a great deal of information about this 
case that the jury, presumably, won’t have”). An attorney familiar with the Waco proceedings 
similarly noted that “one of the big factors is that [the judge] has been living with this thing 
since it happened, so there’s a lot of background information that you wouldn’t have to put on 
for [the judge], but you would have to put on with a jury.” Hancock, supra note 8. 
Even in a more typical case, the district court will often be familiar with the basic facts 
and issues in the case through motions to dismiss, summary judgment motions, or other pre-
trial filings by the parties. 
 118.  See Hancock, supra note 75. 
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As the conclusion of the trial approached, the litigants submitted 
extensive proposed jury instructions, and the court held a hearing 
outside the presence of the jury to settle on which instructions and 
verdict forms were to be used. After the parties rested their cases, 
lawyers for both sides presented lengthy closing arguments to 
summarize the evidence for the jurors, and the court then read aloud 
the instructions to the jury. All of these steps, which would have 
been eliminated or reduced in a bench trial, extended the length of 
the trial. 
Although the Waco/Branch Davidian trial was unusual in certain 
respects, these preceding inefficiencies are likely present to varying 
degrees in more typical advisory jury trials. In this time of overloaded 
court dockets, the conservation and wise expenditure of judicial 
resources are valid concerns, and courts can ill afford the “waste of 
the additional time and money which is inherent to a jury trial.”119 In 
fact, several courts have declined to use advisory juries based on the 
additional time and expense inherent in trying a case to a jury.120 
Although these inefficiencies and their related complications may not 
be dispositive in a court’s decision whether to use an advisory jury, 
they do counsel against the use of advisory juries. 
B. The Advisory Jury’s Influence on the Presentations Made at Trial 
Although an advisory jury may initially appear to be a passive, 
benign presence in the courtroom because the court, not the jury, 
makes the ultimate decision regarding the United States’ liability 




 119.  Hildebrand v. Bd. of Trs., 607 F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir. 1979). 
 120.  See Dewey Elecs. Corp. v. Montage, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 73, 75 (M.D. Pa. 1987) 
(declining use of advisory jury in non-FTCA case because “a jury trial’s requirements of 
openings, summations and jury instructions would be replaced by a trial brief in a bench trial, 
with a concomitant saving of judicial resources”); Skoldberg v. Villani, 601 F. Supp. 981, 982 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (declining to use advisory jury in part because of “the additional time and 
expense involved in presenting this case to a jury”); Pan Am. Corp. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
1994 WL 174318, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1994). But see Note, supra note 43 at 1368–69 
(citing “the modest impact of the advisory jury on trial length,” but also noting that the 
“problem of case backlog in federal courts is serious enough that even a modest increase in trial 
time is potentially significant”). 
 121.  28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
ZAB-FIN 2/15/2003 2:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
214 
different audience than a federal district court judge.122 Simply put, 
lawyers present a different case at trial when an advisory jury is 
present.123 
In the Waco/Branch Davidian trial, for instance, a lawyer who 
was involved in prior litigation relating to the 1993 Waco standoff 
opined that the court’s decision to use an advisory jury would 
require last-minute changes in trial strategy: “Any time you have a 
case, if you’re trying it to a court, you’re going to do it a certain way, 
and if you’re trying it to jurors, you have to use [a] different 
approach.”124 
Not all of the differences between a judge-only trial and the use 
of an advisory jury are benign. One concern in the Waco trial was 
that the advisory jury would be susceptible to arguments based more 
on emotion than the evidence.125 For example, one of the 
government attorneys reportedly recognized the persuasive appeal 
the case could have for an advisory jury, in large part, “because so 
many children had died in the fire.”126 Even before the trial, a lawyer 
 
 122.  The courts that have used advisory juries in FTCA cases have not discussed or 
analyzed what effect the jury’s presence might have had on the proceedings or whether it is a 
positive or negative influence. 
 123.  As one court put it, “[a]ny good trial lawyer will testify that there are significant 
tactical differences in presenting and arguing a case to a jury as opposed to a judge.” 
Hildebrand, 607 F.2d at 710; see also Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(noting that “[t]here are frequently significant tactical differences in presenting a case to a 
court, as opposed to a jury”). 
One might argue that, because the judge—and not the advisory jury—makes the final 
decision, the presence of an advisory jury should not affect the presentations made at trial. This 
would seem to ignore the reality of the situation. By impaneling the advisory jury, the judge 
has demonstrated his or her interest in receiving the jury’s advice. Accordingly, attorneys will 
attempt to persuade the jury, which in turn may influence the judge. Indeed, it would arguably 
be a very questionable trial strategy to ignore the advisory jury and focus solely on a 
presentation designed to persuade the court. 
 124.  Hancock, supra note 8 (quoting attorney who litigated earlier case relating to 1993 
Waco standoff); see also AM Int’l v. Eastman Kodak Co., 648 F. Supp. 506, 509 (N.D. Ill. 
1986) (denying plaintiff’s late request for jury trial because the defendant had “spent the 
previous six years preparing for a bench trial,” and to require the defendant “to prepare for a 
jury trial at this late date would impose a substantial burden on [the defendant]”). 
 125.  See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 105, at 1424–25 (contending that 
“[j]uries . . . create an outlet for ‘demagoguery within the American legal system,’ encouraging 
trial lawyers to be overly flamboyant and to subordinate substance to style”) (quoting Paul D. 
Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
33, 39–41); Moyer v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 390, 397 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (noting, in 
setting aside advisory jury’s verdict, that the verdict “was largely the result of sympathy”). 
 126.  Fisk, supra note 6. 
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familiar with the proceedings and participants stated that the 
presence of the advisory jury could help the Davidians’ lawyers, 
because they “will play the violin right from the very beginning” and 
“will wave the bloody shirts on all the kids.”127 
This prediction proved to be accurate. At trial, the lead plaintiffs’ 
attorney focused his opening statement and much of his case on the 
children who died in the fire, frequently referring to a videotape and 
a board of photographs displaying their young faces.128 Likewise, 
“[m]uch of the plaintiffs’ closing argument appealed to jurors’ 
emotions,” as the plaintiffs’ attorneys “described sect members as 
peaceful church people; . . . showed photographs of three babies 
who died; and . . . read aloud part of the Declaration of 
Independence.”129 It is unlikely that a similar approach would have 
been used if the trial would have been presented only to the district 
court judge, who had been described as a “no-nonsense” judge and 
a “tough jurist with a precise legal mind.”130 
Reasonable persons can disagree on whether presentations 
designed for a judge or those designed for a jury are preferable and 
what criteria should be used in evaluating them.131 However, because 
the presence of an advisory jury will alter the presentations made by 
the litigants at trial, it will change the nature of the proceedings. 
Therefore, an advisory jury is not an inconsequential presence in the 
courtroom that does not affect the course of the trial. Instead, it 
presents a substantive influence on the proceedings that weighs 
against impaneling an advisory jury. 
C. The Systemic Costs of Advisory Juries 
Trial by jury in the United States is an important and valued 
right and responsibility, as illustrated by its inclusion in the Seventh 
 
 127.  Ganey, supra note 5. Before the trial, the Davidians’ attorneys thought that the 
participation of the advisory jury would improve their chances. See Hancock, supra note 8. 
 128.  See Mark England, Davidian Lawyers Focus on Children, WACO TRIB.-HERALD, 
June 21, 2000, at 1A; Lee Hancock, Lawyers Debate Who’s at Fault in Waco Case: Children, 
Koresh in Spotlight as Testimony Opens, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 21, 2000, at 1A. 
 129.  Jennifer Autrey & Barry Shlachter, Jury Clears U.S. Agents at Waco, FORT WORTH 
STAR-TELEGRAM, July 15, 2000, at 1A. 
 130.  Hancock, No-Nonsense Style, supra note 3. 
 131.  See, e.g., Culley, supra note 104, at 30 (arguing that “[b]ench trials tend to 
encourage sloppy presentations,” while jury trials produce better advocacy). 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution.132 Although the jury 
system has been sharply criticized on a variety of grounds,133 
Americans overwhelmingly support the participation of citizens in 
deciding cases as jurors.134 As such, our society views citizen 
involvement on juries as an interest worth preserving.135 
It is thus worthwhile to examine the effect advisory juries may 
have on the jury system, particularly because an advisory jury is not 
mandated by the Constitution or by statute, but instead is a 
discretionary device the court may use in reaching its decision. Little, 
if any, relevant statistical research or literature exists regarding the 
impact of advisory juries on the jury system. However, the use of 
advisory juries raises several concerns, including juror apathy, juror 
disillusionment, and a decreased appreciation of the importance of 
jury service. 
One concern is that jurors’ advisory status might negatively affect 
their commitment to their fact-finding task. Knowing that their 
verdict is not binding, some jurors may undervalue their 
responsibilities and may choose not to pay close attention to the 
evidence presented at trial. They also may fail to deliberate 
vigorously, instead quickly reaching any kind of consensus, knowing  
 
 
 132.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the Framers, 
“if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury”). 
 133.  See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS 
OF REFORM 1–15 (1995) (summarizing criticisms of civil jury system); Kalven, supra note 84, 
at 1055–56 (noting that “virtually since its inception it has been embroiled in controversy, 
attracting at once the most extravagant praise and the harshest criticism”). 
 134.  See Priest, supra note 107, at 104, 127 (noting the “widespread support for the 
civil jury” and “the extraordinary public endorsement of the civil jury”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 
U.S. 400, 406 (1991) (stating that the “opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the 
administration of justice has long been recognized as one of the principal justifications for 
retaining the jury system”). 
 135.  Powers, 499 U.S. at 406. Alexis de Tocqueville viewed American juries as a 
“gratuitous public school” that permitted citizen-jurors to become “practically acquainted with 
the laws,” and that the “political good sense” of Americans was due to the “long use that they 
have made of the jury in civil cases.” See Friedman, supra note 74, at 203 (quoting ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284–85 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1946)); see also 
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 252 
(1994) (stating that “[j]ury duty falls upon millions of Americans each year, making the jury 
system the most widespread example of participatory democracy in the United States today”); 
Kalven, supra note 84, at 1062 (noting that “the jury provides an important civic experience 
for the citizen”); Culley, supra note 104, at 29 (describing the jury as “an instrument of 
participatory democracy”). 
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that the court can and will make the final decision regardless of the 
jury’s verdict. 
At least one commentator has recognized the potentially 
detrimental impact their “advisory” status may have on advisory 
jurors: 
[T]he Federal Tort Claims Act does not permit a jury in an action 
brought against the government. When such an action is joined 
with a claim against another defendant to which a jury is available, 
it may be desirable to request that the jury also sit as an advisory 
jury as to the claim against the United States so that the jury will not 
perceive that it is deciding only half the case or that its verdict is not 
important.136 
This concern for jurors’ sense of purpose is heightened in the 
context of a straight FTCA case. In that situation, the advisory jurors 
are not merely “deciding only half the case,” they are essentially 
deciding none of the case. Presumably, this would even further 
decrease their perceived sense of importance to the proceeding and 
ultimate resolution of the case. 
Of course, this concern assumes that the jurors realize they are 
serving only in a non-binding advisory capacity and that the court 
must make its own independent decision notwithstanding their 
verdict.137 In some cases, however, the judge may decide not to 
inform the jurors of their advisory status until after they have 
returned a verdict.138 Even where the court does inform the jurors of 
their advisory status, the timing and thoroughness of the explanation 
may shape the attitudes of the jurors and the diligence of their 
efforts. 
The judge in the Waco/Branch Davidian trial apparently was 
concerned about this issue. In ordering that a jury be impaneled and 
in supervising the selection of the jury, the court did not disclose 
that the jurors would be serving in an advisory capacity. Moreover, 
 
 136.  MOORE ET AL., supra note 43, ¶ 39.41, at 39–87 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). 
 137.  The published cases generally do not indicate whether the jurors were informed of 
their advisory status. 
 138.  See, e.g., Gragg v. City of Omaha, 812 F. Supp. 991, 991–92 (D. Neb. 1993) 
(indicating, in non-FTCA case, that court “did not inform the jury that it was acting in an 
advisory capacity”). Admittedly, not informing juries would satisfy the concern that jurors 
would be less attentive and committed to their responsibilities if they were aware of their 
advisory status from the outset. 
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the court simultaneously entered a sealed order “clarify[ing] that the 
jury is being empaneled as an advisory jury” and strictly prohibited 
the attorneys in the case from making any reference to the jury “as 
an advisory jury.”139 This attempt to suppress the advisory nature of 
the jury suggests that the court was concerned that the jurors’ 
knowledge of their advisory status would adversely affect the quality 
of their service. 
Finally, there may be a related systemic cost—in terms of the 
public’s perception of jury service—inherent in using advisory jurors. 
Presumably, it is desirable for citizens to have a positive view of their 
civic duty to occasionally serve as jurors. Yet many who are called for 
jury duty view it as a burden to avoid, citing professional or family 
responsibilities that would hinder or preclude jury service, or simply 
do not show up at all.140 
The use of advisory juries, as opposed to regular juries, could 
exacerbate this perception. Advisory jurors may respond negatively 
when told they are being asked to take time away from their jobs and 
families to serve as jurors—sometimes in a protracted trial—but that 
their verdict is non-binding.141 Alternatively, if the jurors are not 
informed of their advisory status until after the trial, that late-
delivered information may have an adverse impact on their 
impression of the jury system. 
These undesirable byproducts of advisory juries illustrate the 
social cost of requiring citizens to serve as jurors when the judge is 
under a statutory obligation not to be unduly influenced by their 
 
 139.  Andrade v. United States, Civ. No. W-96-CA-139 (and consolidated actions), 
Docket No. 644, at 1–2 (W.D. Tex. May 26, 2000) (order to impanel advisory jury). 
Nevertheless, the media promptly discovered and explained that, because of the FTCA’s 
prohibition on jury trials, the jury would be serving in an advisory capacity. See England, supra 
note 117 (reporting that “[w]hile there will be a jury in the June 19 trial on the wrongful-
death lawsuit filed by surviving Branch Davidians against the federal government, [the judge] 
won’t have to follow its verdict”). It is unknown whether the jurors became aware of their 
advisory status through these media reports. 
 140.  See STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN 
COURTROOM 219–20 (1994) (describing efforts to avoid jury service and noting that the 
“national no-show rate is about 55 percent”); Zebrowski, supra note 108, at 31 (noting that 
“[j]urors and their employers are becoming increasingly less tolerant of the demands of jury 
service”). 
 141.  See Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of 
Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 107, 
at 282, 286 (reporting that “one of the primary dissatisfactions voiced by jurors is that their 
time has been wasted”). 
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advisory verdict.142 Likewise, the use of citizens as advisory jurors, as 
opposed to regular jurors, may have a diluting effect on the public’s 
perception of the importance and desirability of jury service. 
Considering that an advisory jury is an optional aid not required by 
the Constitution or any statute, the systemic costs generated by 
advisory juries counsel against their use in FTCA cases. 
D. The Use of Advisory Juries in High-Profile Cases 
When the issues in an FTCA case are highly publicized or 
politicized, an advisory jury may be especially attractive to a federal 
district court judge. Faced with making the decision on his or her 
own, the judge may seek to share some of the perceived 
responsibility for the decision with an advisory jury consisting of 
members of the community. 
However, the decision to use an advisory jury is a roll of the dice 
by the judge. If the advisory jury returns a verdict consistent with the 
court’s independent judgment, both the judge and the public have 
arguably benefited from the decision. The judge has been vindicated 
by the collective judgment of a cross-section of the community.143 
The public, in turn, has benefited from participation in the trial 
through its representative jurors, and a jury verdict in such cases 
likely will be more acceptable to the public than a decision by a 
single federal judge.144 Although the law is clear that the federal 
judge, not the advisory jury, must make the final decision on the 
United States’ liability, an advisory jury verdict admittedly can lend a 
 
 142.  This social cost may also be present in situations where a judge enters a judgment as 
a matter of law reversing a jury verdict. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (providing that a court may 
enter judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding a jury verdict). However, in the Rule 50(b) 
situation, the court’s decision to reverse an unsustainable jury verdict is a necessary evil. In the 
advisory jury situation, on the other hand, the court’s statutory obligation to make an 
independent decision in the case requires the court to essentially disregard an advisory jury’s 
verdict from the outset. 
 143.  See Note, supra note 43, at 1376 (stating that, like a typical jury, “the advisory jury 
increases the legitimacy of the administration of law through the participation of the people 
who live under that law”). 
 144.  See Hannaford et al., supra note 115, at 251 (noting that the “allocation of decision 
making between the judge and [regular] jury injects ‘community values’ into the judicial 
process while shielding the judge from criticism for unpopular decisions and insulating the 
whole justice system from allegations of elitism, judicial bias, and political influence”); Note, 
supra note 43, at 1374 (stating that “the involvement of people from the broader community 
gives content to an imprecise and subjective legal standard and legitimizes the decision of the 
lone judge”). 
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degree of credibility to the judge’s decision in an otherwise 
controversial case.145 
On the other hand, if the advisory jury’s verdict conflicts with 
the judge’s view of the evidence, the judge is in an extremely 
precarious situation. To agree with a jury verdict that does not reflect 
his views would be a complete abdication of his statutory obligation 
to independently decide an FTCA case. The other option—of 
seemingly reversing an advisory jury verdict—is equally unappealing. 
In doing so, the court may create even more controversy about the 
case than if he or she had just made the decision in the first instance 
without the assistance of an advisory jury. 
In a highly publicized or particularly controversial case, the stakes 
of this gamble are especially high. The Waco/Branch Davidian civil 
trial provides a compelling illustration because of the intense public 
interest in the events at Waco, which was fueled in part by extensive 
governmental investigations,146 the activities of various conspiracy 
 
 145.  In trials involving highly controversial public events such as Waco, trying the case 
with an advisory jury may also confer a public benefit by making the trial more open. For 
example, jury trial strategy may often persuade the litigants to have their side’s witnesses testify 
in open court, rather than through the submission and private viewing of deposition excerpts 
by a federal judge. See supra notes 117, 123–24 and accompanying text. The same may be true 
of the formal introduction and explanation of key documentary and physical evidence. See 
supra notes 117, 123–24 and accompanying text. 
 146.  In 1995, Congress conducted extensive televised hearings on the events at Waco. 
See Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians: Joint 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. 
on Nat’l Sec., Int’l Affairs, and Crim. Just. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 
104th Cong. (1995); H.R. REP. NO. 104-749 (1996); see also Events Surrounding the Branch 
Davidian Cult Standoff in Waco, Texas, Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
103d Cong. (1993); H.R. REP. NO. 106-1037 (2000). 
Extensive investigations were also conducted by the Department of Justice. See 
RICHARD SCRUGGS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE EVENTS AT WACO, 
TEXAS, FEBRUARY 28 TO APRIL 19, 1993 (1993); EDWARD S.G. DENNIS, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL: EVALUATION OF THE HANDLING OF 
THE BRANCH DAVIDIAN STAND-OFF IN WACO, TEXAS BY THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
AND THE FEDERAL. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (1993). The Department of the Treasury also 
conducted an investigation. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT ON THE BUREAU OF 
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS INVESTIGATION OF VERNON WAYNE HOWELL ALSO 
KNOWN AS DAVID KORESH (1993). 
In 1999, the Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel to examine the events at 
Waco. See JOHN C. DANFORTH, SPECIAL COUNSEL, INTERIM REPORT TO THE DEPUTY 
ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING THE 1993 CONFRONTATION AT THE MT. CARMEL 
COMPLEX, WACO, TEXAS (2000); JOHN C. DANFORTH, SPECIAL COUNSEL, FINAL REPORT 
TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING THE 1993 CONFRONTATION AT THE 
MT. CARMEL COMPLEX, WACO, TEXAS (2000) [hereinafter OSC FINAL REPORT]. 
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and anti-government groups dedicated to the Davidian cause,147 and 
the controversial allegations made by the plaintiffs.148 And if the 
events at Waco were not sufficiently tragic in themselves, they were 
subsequently viewed in the shadow of the Oklahoma City bombing, 
which was committed on the second anniversary of the Waco fire in 
retaliation for what Timothy McVeigh viewed as the injustice at 
Waco.149 
As the Waco/Branch Davidian trial approached, neither the 
plaintiffs nor the United States requested an advisory jury.150 
Nonetheless, the district court judge assigned to hear the case, 
“[h]aving considered the importance of the issues involved in this 
 
 147.  The Branch Davidian cause has been promoted through books, documentary films, 
and internet sites. See, e.g., DAVID THIBODEAU & LEON WHITESON, A PLACE CALLED WACO: 
A SURVIVOR’S STORY (1999); DICK J. REAVIS, THE ASHES OF WACO: AN INVESTIGATION 
(1995); ARMAGEDDON IN WACO (Stuart A. Wright ed., 1996); CAROL MOORE, THE 
DAVIDIAN MASSACRE (1995); WACO: THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (Fifth Estate Productions 
1997); WACO: A NEW REVELATION (MGA Films, Inc. 1999); Stephen D. O’Leary, Waco Fire 
Continues to Burn on the Web, ONLINE JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 13, 2000), at 
http://ojr.org/ojr/ethics/1017962869.php; Waco Holocaust Electronic Museum, at 
http://www.public-action.com/SkyWriter/WacoMuseum/ (last updated August 19, 2001); 
The Davidian Massacre Pages, at http://www.carolmoore.net/waco (last visited Feb. 8, 
2003). 
It has been said that “[v]irtually every right-wing antigovernment group points back to 
Waco as the moment that Washington waged war on its own people.” Daniel Klaidman & 
Michael Isikoff, A Fire That Won’t Die, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1999, at 24; see also Ben 
Macintyre, Waco Cult Puts FBI in Dock Over Siege Deaths, TIMES (London), June 20, 2000, at 
18 (noting that the “Waco siege has become a defining moment in US cultural history, the 
source of countless conspiracies and the trigger for further violence”). 
 148.  For the specific allegations made by the plaintiffs, see supra note 5. See also Duggan, 
supra note 8 (noting that “[t]o a lot of people—particularly those who inhabit an Internet 
realm where tales of sinister government conspiracies abound—‘Waco’ has become a shorthand 
term for a mass murder and coverup orchestrated by secret enemies of freedom in 
Washington”). 
 149.  See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1177 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that 
McVeigh and his accomplice Terry Nichols “had decided to take some type of positive 
offensive action against the federal government in response to the government’s siege of the 
Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, in 1993”); see also United States v. Fortier, 180 F.3d 1217, 
1220 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 150.  Interestingly, after the trial judge decided to impanel an advisory jury, the lead 
plaintiffs’ attorney stated before trial that the plaintiffs “were very happy at having a jury” and 
that “it was wise for [the judge] to bring in a jury.” England, supra note 117; see also Hancock, 
supra note 8 (quoting lead plaintiffs’ attorney’s approval of advisory jury). After losing at trial, 
however, this same attorney condemned the judge’s decision to impanel the advisory jury as “a 
ruse to provide the judge with cover for a controversial decision.” Lee Hancock, Ruling Ends 
Suit Over Waco Siege, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 21, 2000, at 1A [hereinafter Hancock, 
Ruling Ends Suit]. 
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case,” ordered that an advisory jury be impaneled to issue a 
verdict.151 Despite the United States’ opposition to the procedure, 
the court went ahead with the advisory jury as planned.152 
We can only speculate as to the trial judge’s motivations for 
deciding to use an advisory jury. Most obvious was the gravity of the 
charges made against the government, namely, that the federal 
government had intentionally or negligently caused the deaths of 
approximately eighty of its citizens. Moreover, in large part because 
he had presided over the criminal trial and conviction of several 
Branch Davidians, the district court judge was viewed by some as 
being biased against the Branch Davidians,153 who had previously 
attempted to have the judge recused from the civil case on that 
basis.154 
Whatever the court’s motivations, once the decision was made to 
impanel an advisory jury, the general sentiment was that the 
resolution of the case would be more widely accepted because of the 
jury’s participation.155 For example, one commentator noted that 
“the move [to impanel an advisory jury] distributes the responsibility 
for the verdict. And should the jury’s recommendation go against 
the Davidians, it would help bury conspiracy theories deeper than 
would a ruling from a lone federal judge.”156 The plaintiffs’ attorneys 
agreed that the participation of an advisory jury would “ensure 
greater public acceptance of any verdict.”157 
 
 151.  Andrade v. United States, Civ. No. W-96-CA-139 (and consolidated actions), 
Docket No. 643, at 2 (W.D. Tex. May 26, 2000) (order to impanel advisory jury); Hancock, 
supra note 8; Ganey, supra note 5. 
 152.  See Lee Hancock, Judge to Decide if Agents Fired in Siege, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, June 13, 2000, at 19A (stating that the judge “rejected a secret government bid, 
filed . . . under court seal, to reconsider the decision to bring a jury into the case”). 
 153.  See, e.g., Richard Leiby, Trial Set in Suit Over Davidians’ Fiery End, WASH. POST, 
July 14, 1999, at A3 (citing allegation by Branch Davidians that trial judge was prejudiced 
against them). 
 154.  See Hancock, supra note 8 (reporting that lead plaintiffs’ attorney “went all the way 
to the U.S. Supreme Court in a failed bid to have the judge removed from the civil case 
because of potential bias”). 
 155.  See England, supra note 117 (quoting law professor as opining that “whatever the 
decision, it will be more widely accepted if there is a jury”). 
 156.  Ganey, supra note 5. 
 157.  Hancock, supra note 8; see also Duggan, supra note 8 (quoting lead plaintiffs’ 
attorney as stating “[g]iven the circumstances, I think [the judge] recognizes that a jury verdict 
will be perceived as more fair by the American people than a verdict by a judge who gets his 
paycheck from the U.S. government”). 
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After considering four weeks of testimony and evidence, it took 
the advisory jury less than an hour of deliberation to return a 
unanimous verdict in favor of the United States on all issues.158 
Approximately two months later, the district court judge filed a 
written opinion absolving the United States of liability and 
concluding that “[t]he entire tragedy . . . can be laid at the feet of 
this one individual [David Koresh].”159 
Therefore, the ironic outcome of the Waco/Branch Davidian 
trial was that the United States, which opposed the judge’s use of 
the advisory jury, actually benefited greatly from its use. The advisory 
jury verdict arguably had a far greater influence on public opinion 
than a written decision by a single federal judge. Even the lead 
plaintiffs’ attorney viewed the verdict as being conclusive: “I think 
the vast majority of the American people will take this [the advisory 
jury verdict] as the final word.”160 In a certain sense, therefore, the 
advisory jury in the Waco/Branch Davidian trial served a valuable 
purpose by providing at least the perception of public participation 
in laying this controversial incident to rest. 
However, it is interesting to contemplate the consequences if 
things would have worked out differently. If the advisory jury verdict 
had gone against the United States, the judge would have been in an 
extremely difficult situation.161 A court decision contrary to that of 
the advisory jury—notwithstanding the court’s statutory obligation  
 
 
 158.  See Hancock, Ruling Ends Suit, supra note 150 (stating that “jurors returned a 
verdict for the government in less than three hours, and court personnel later said their actual 
deliberations took less than an hour”); see also Jim Yardley, Government Cleared in Deaths at 
Waco, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at A27 (stating that advisory jurors “deliberated for less 
than two hours”). 
 159.  Andrade v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 778, 785 n.2 (W.D. Tex. 2000). The 
Office of Special Counsel’s investigation—which involved interviews of 1001 witnesses, the 
review of over 2.3 million pages of documents, and the examination of thousands of pounds of 
physical evidence—similarly concluded that “[r]esponsibility for the tragedy of Waco rests with 
certain of the Branch Davidians and their leader, Vernon Howell, also known as David 
Koresh.” OSC FINAL REPORT, supra note 146, at 4–5. 
 160.  Hancock, supra note 75. 
 161.  Before the conclusion of the trial, the court “noted he might be in ‘one hell’ of a 
position with his decision to impanel an advisory jury for a type of civil case normally decided 
by a judge alone.” Hancock,  supra note 63. However, the judge was reported as telling 
lawyers in chambers early in the trial that “if you don’t think I’ve got the guts to disregard this 
jury verdict, you’re wrong.” Id. Of course, this presumes that the district court judge arrived at 
his decision absolving the United States of liability through an independent consideration of 
the evidence presented at trial. 
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to make an independent decision—likely would have been viewed as 
reversing the judgment of the advisory jury. 
It is not difficult to imagine the fallout if the judge would have 
found it necessary to reject an advisory jury verdict in favor of the 
Branch Davidians and rule for the United States. Notwithstanding 
the structural and functional independence of the federal judiciary, a 
certain segment of the public would have viewed a decision by the 
trial judge to disregard an advisory jury verdict against the United 
States as yet another continuation of the alleged federal conspiracy 
against the Branch Davidians. Rather than providing closure to the 
Branch Davidian incident, such a decision by the judge likely would 
have further stoked the fires of the Waco controversy.162 
In sum, the decision by a federal district judge to use an advisory 
jury in a high-profile FTCA case is fraught with risk. With luck, an 
advisory jury verdict can lend additional credibility and public 
acceptance to a judge’s decision, as was the fortunate outcome in the 
Waco/Branch Davidian trial. Without such luck, however, an 
advisory jury verdict can exacerbate the controversy that induced the 
judge to impanel a jury in the first instance. 
Of course, the risk/benefit analysis must be made by individual 
judges in individual cases. However, the much wiser course is for 
courts to honor the FTCA’s statutory mandate by deciding even 
high-profile cases on their own without the assistance of an advisory 
jury, thus avoiding the potential for inconsistent decisions by judge 
and jury. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Federal district court judges are understandably drawn to 
advisory juries. The use of an advisory jury allows a judge to sound 
out the public’s opinion on the case and to share some of the 
responsibility for deciding the case. And as long as the court 
explicitly professes to make an independent, final decision as to the 
United States’ liability under the FTCA, the court can argue that it is 
not violating the FTCA’s statutory proscription of jury trials. 
 
 
 162.  Indeed, it has been noted that the trial judge’s ruling, which was consistent with 
the advisory jury’s verdict, “most definitely will not put an end to the Internet-fueled excesses 
of the conspiratorial community.” Editorial, Waco: The Government Didn’t Do It, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Sept. 24, 2000, at 36A. 
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The use of an advisory jury does, however, violate the letter and 
spirit of the FTCA’s prohibition of jury trials, which does not 
contemplate the input of a jury of any kind. An advisory jury likewise 
requires meaningful outlays of time and resources by the court, the 
parties, and the jurors themselves. And because of the advisory, non-
binding nature of their verdicts, advisory juries may unnecessarily 
impose undesirable systemic strains on the jury system. 
Congress expressly charged federal district courts with the 
responsibility of deciding FTCA cases without a jury. 
Notwithstanding the use of a judicial fiction suggesting otherwise, a 
court cannot use an advisory jury and still remain faithful to the 
FTCA’s statutory proscription of jury trials. Considering the 
unnecessary costs and complications generated by advisory juries, 
courts are best served by adhering to the FTCA’s text by simply 
deciding FTCA cases on their own, without the assistance of a jury 
of any kind. 
ZAB-FIN 2/15/2003 2:23 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
226 
 
